Establishing Wealth Management Subsidiaries (WMS) is a crucial measure to prevent the risk of Wealth Management Products (WMP) from spreading to commercial banks in China. It has become an important issue to study whether and how establishing WMS effectively reduces the risk-taking of banks. In this paper, we investigate the effects of establishing WMS on the risk-taking level of parent banks based on quarterly data from 84 banks between 2018 and 2021. By using the difference-in-differences (DID) methodology, we find that establishing WMS significantly reduces parent banks' risk-taking, primarily through reduced non-perform asset shifting and deleveraging. This effect is more pronounced in state-owned and joint-stock banks, but not in urban and rural banks. Additionally, our results indicate that the overall risk within the bank holding groups remains unchanged when consolidating the balance sheets of parent banks and their WMS. These findings suggest that while establishing WMS effectively mitigates the risk of parent banks, it does not enhance the risk profile of WMP and bank holding groups.